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Mortgages.  Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Providence Business 
Loan Fund, Inc., 200 A.3d 153 (R.I. 2019).  Pursuant to Rhode 
Island General Laws section 34-26-7, a mortgage will become void 
after “thirty-five (35) years from the date of the recording of the 
mortgage, or in the case of a mortgage in which the term or 
maturity date is stated, five (5) years from the expiration of the 
term or maturity date.”1 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On June 2, 1992, Norris Waldron (Waldron) granted a 
mortgage to Providence Business Loan Fund (Defendant) “as 
security for a loan in the amount of $70,660” with a stated term of 
ten years.2  The mortgage was recorded in the Providence land 
evidence records on June 3, 1992, without a maturity date.3  Four 
years later, on December 20, 1996, Waldron and Defendant 
“entered into a ‘Modification Agreement’” which reduced the 
amount owed to $44,016.75, “to be repaid over a period of 108 
months, beginning on January 1, 1997.”4  This modification 
agreement was never recorded in the Providence land evidence 
records, but the two parties created an amendment to the original 
1992 mortgage, which specified the reduction in the amount of debt 
owed.5  The newly amended 1992 mortgage, however, “failed to 
reflect the 108-month term listed in the modification agreement 
and it did not specify any other term or maturity date.”6  
On January 23, 2004, “Waldron conveyed the property to 
Jocelyn Waldron by quitclaim deed,”7 and years later, on October 
1. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Providence Bus. Loan Fund, Inc., 200
A.3d 153, 157 (R.I. 2019).
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29, 2014, Jocelyn conveyed the property to Broad Street, LLC by 
warranty deed.8  It was not until February 8, 2017, that “defendant 
gave notice to Broad Street LLC of its commencement of foreclosure 
proceedings on the 1992 mortgage.”9 Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC 
(Plaintiff), a lienholder on the property, filed a complaint in 
Superior Court on March 6, 2017, “seeking a declaration that 
defendant’s mortgage had been discharged under [Rhode Island 
General Laws] § 34-26-7 . . . and that, therefore, defendant had no 
right to foreclose on the property.”10 
On May 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that the original mortgage had expired pursuant 
to section 34-26-7, and that even if the amendment filed in 1997 
“had properly extended the mortgage,” the Defendant would still be 
barred from foreclosing the property.11  The Defendant countered 
that since the original mortgage did not include a maturity date, 
that automatically created a “thirty-five-year lien,” as stated in the 
statute.12  The Defendant argued in the alternative that because 
the amendment, which was recorded in the Providence land 
evidence records, did not include a term or maturity date, this 
meant the amendment extended the expiration period to thirty-five 
years from January 1, 1997.13 
The hearing justice ultimately “found the 1997 amendment to 
be a ‘non-compliant mortgage extension, which is ineffective under 
the statute.’”14  She also found the 1992 mortgage to be the 
operative document, and as such, the Defendant’s mortgage had 
expired because the 1992 mortgage stated a term of ten years.15 
The hearing justice, upon analyzing the “plain and ordinary 
meaning” of the statute, concluded that, since the mortgage 
contained an express term, the statute allowed for “exercise of the 
power of sale only five years following that term.”16  Further, 
because the term ended in 2002, the mortgage had expired in 
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2007.17  Accordingly, the hearing justice granted the Plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment.18  The Defendant timely filed a 
notice of appeal.19 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court) reviewed the 
hearing justice’s grant of the motion for summary judgment de 
novo.20  The Court stated it would only affirm the trial court’s 
decision if it concluded that “no genuine issue of material fact exists 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”21  The Defendant “b[ore] the burden of proving by competent 
evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.”22  
During the hearing, the Defendant contended that “the hearing 
justice erred in granting [the] motion for summary judgment” 
because there was an issue of material fact over “whether the 1992 
mortgage ha[d] expired.”23  Defendant argued that “the 1997 
amendment [was] the only proper instrument to determine the 
validity of the 1992 mortgage.”24  Specifically, Defendant asserted 
that because the amendment was executed before the 1992 
mortgage expired, it “created an extension of thirty-five (35) 
years.”25  Additionally, the Defendant argued that “at a minimum 
the mortgage [was] valid for thirty-five years from June 3, 1992.”26 
Conversely, the Plaintiff “maintain[ed] that the 1992 mortgage 
ha[d] expired under the statute,” and that the 1997 amendment, 
even if valid, “would not extend the original mortgage.”27 
In deciding whether the 1992 mortgage ran for thirty-five 




20. Id. (quoting Pineda v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 186 A.3d 1054, 1056
(R.I. 2018)). 
21. Id. (quoting Cancel v. City of Providence, 187 A.3d 347, 350 (R.I.
2018)). 
22. Id. (quoting Newstone Dev., LLC v. East Pac. LLC, 140 A.3d 100, 103
(R.I. 2016)). 
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stated that it “give[s] the words their plan and ordinary meaning” 
when the language is “clear and unambiguous.”28  It continued that 
it has held that “the words ‘or’ and ‘and’ are not the equivalent of 
each other and should not be considered as interchangeable unless 
reasonably necessary in order to give effect to the intention of the 
enacting body.”29  The Court applied that principle when reviewing 
section 34-26-7, specifically the provision stating 
that foreclosure proceedings may not be brought “after the 
expiration of a period which shall be thirty-five (35) years 
from the date of recording of the mortgage, or in the case of 
a mortgage in which the term or maturity date is stated, 
five (5) years from the expiration of the term of the 
maturity date.”30  
The Court held that, in light of the plain language of the statute, 
“the 1992 mortgage ran for the ten-year term, plus five years 
following expiration of that term.”31 
Lastly, the Court addressed the 1997 amendment and its 
consequences.  The Court again looked to section 34-26-7,  which 
provides “[t]he period [in which a power of sale may be exercised] 
shall not be extended by nonresidence nor disability of any person 
interested in the mortgage or the real estate, or by any partial 
payment, agreement, extension, acknowledgment, affidavit or 
other action not meeting the requirements.”32  It was clear to the 
Court that any change to the original mortgage was required to “be 
indexed in the land evidence records under the name of the present 
landowner.”33  Since the amendment did not list the 108-month 
term, it failed to extend the term of the 1992 mortgage.34  Though 
the language of the amendment clearly indicated that the parties 
intended to amend the 1992 mortgage to include the amount owed, 
it did not affect the mortgage in any other way.35 
28. Id. (quoting Rein v. ESS Grp., Inc., 184 A.3d 695, 702 (R.I. 2018)).
29. Id. at 158 (quoting Earle v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Warwick, 191 A.2d




33. Id. (quoting 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-26-7).
34. Id. at 155, 158.
35. Id. at 159.
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COMMENTARY 
The Court properly found that the Defendant did not meet the 
requirements of section 34-26-7 in order to extend the 1992 
mortgage, and thus the mortgage expired in 2007.36  The Court’s 
reasoning in upholding the judgment of the hearing justice was 
sound because after giving the words of the statute their plain and 
ordinary meaning, there was no genuine dispute of material facts 
in the case at bar.37   
However, one could argue that based upon the clear language 
of the modification to the mortgage, the parties’ failure to include a 
specific date could have been intentional.38  If the Court had taken 
this perspective, the portion of the modification which states, “has 
been modified . . . by agreement of even date herewith, to modify 
the terms and to extend the maturity date,” coupled with the 
absence of a specific date, could have modified the previous 
mortgage to rid it of its specified term.39  Under this view, the 
Defendant would have been correct that the mortgage was still 
valid under section 34-26-7, and that the mortgage would have been 
extended thirty-five years from the January 1, 1997 modification.40 
While such an interpretation of the modification may be plausible, 
it nevertheless does not coincide with general standards of contract 
interpretation.  As such, the Defendant failed to prove “by 
competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material 
fact.”41 
CONCLUSION 
The Court held that pursuant to section 34-26-7, the mortgage 
granted to the Defendant expired on June 3, 2007, and that 
“summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was appropriate.”42 
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.43 
Ethan M. Armitano 
36. Id.
37. Id. at 157.
38. See id. at 155.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 155, 157.
41. Id. at 156.
42. Id. at 158.
43. Id. at 159.
